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Michèle Lamont’s How Professors Think is a compelling, nuanced, and richly 
observed empirical study of the inner workings of academic peer review 
panels—the forums convened by major funding agencies to assess research 
grant and fellowship proposals. Based on more than eighty recorded interviews 
with panelists from five organizations and extensive firsthand observations of 
three interdisciplinary panels, the book offers major insights into the “evaluati-
ve cultures” of academic disciplines in the United States and, more broadly, the 
construction of scholarly excellence. As academic gatekeepers, Lamont argues, 
the members of peer review panels collectively play a pivotal role in the dis-
tribution of material and symbolic rewards within the U.S. university system.
At a different level, How Professors Think can be read as an entry into the 
ongoing project of developing a sociological theory of action, especially one 
that takes into account the complex relationship between its two main gene-
rative aspects: practical sense and theoretical reason. Although Lamont often 
refers to principles of scholarly evaluation as criteria (a term that suggests 
relatively codified decision-making standards), she also pays close attention 
to the ephemeral, “emotional,” and fuzzy elements of scholarly judgment. 
Indeed, it is striking how many of the “evanescent” decision-making factors 
Lamont and her respondents refer to make use of the term sense (among others, 
“shared sense,” “common sense,” and “sense of self”). This focus on the prac-
tical sense of peer reviewers allows Lamont to avoid representing scholarly 
excellence either as an immutable or transcendental “essence,” entirely objec-
tive or impervious to socio-historical forces. Yet neither does Lamont depict 
academic evaluation as a simple product of academic status struggles. Instead, 
How Professors Think develops a sophisticated theory of scholarly judgment as 
a mode of collective problem-solving that obeys a set of rules specific to the 
academic sphere. At various points, the book also offers useful insights into the 
contrasting styles and “epistemic cultures” of six academic disciplines.
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In reacting to a study as rich and thoughtful as this book, I find it necessary 
to focus my comments on a central question: What can How Professors Think 
teach us about the cognitive autonomy of U.S. scholars, that is to say, about 
their collective ability to “insulate [themselves] from external forces,” especially 
those originating in the political and economic fields, and “uphold [their] own 
criteria of evaluation over and against those of neighboring or intruding fields”? 
(Wacquant 2007: 269) If this concern narrows the terms of the discussion on 
the one hand, then on the other hand it widens them considerably. After all, 
to address the question will require lifting Lamont’s empirical observations out 
of the specific institutional context in which they were made and considering 
academic peer review panels in comparative perspective. In keeping with the 
request of the symposium editors, I will orient my comments to the “simila-
rities and differences between the panels of experts” in Lamont’s study and 
the world of public policy “think tanks”—the loosely bounded network of 
organizations that have become fixtures of U.S. politics since the 1970s, even 
as they have proliferated around the world, including within Spanish politics 
(see, for example, Freres et al. 2000; McGann 2012; Medvetz 2012).
What is the effect of resituating Lamont’s argument within the wider social 
ecology of knowledge production in the United States? My answer has two 
parts. First, I will argue that this approach allows for a new appreciation of 
How Professors Think that has gone largely unremarked, even within the con-
siderable body of writing that has already emerged in response to it (see the 
editors’ introduction). In particular, the book contains valuable resources for 
sociologists who wish to grasp the notion of cognitive autonomy and apply 
it to the empirical study of intellectuals. Second, I will argue that the book’s 
chief limitation lies in its relatively narrow empirical focus, which gives rise 
to a stance that—while remaining free of epistemological relativism—leads 
to an analytic relativism that insists on giving equal pride of place to both the 
limits and reach of cognitive autonomy. By placing the academic peer review 
panels of Lamont’s study within the wider social ecology of knowledge pro-
duction, we can sketch the broad contours of a more comprehensive view that 
highlights the relative autonomy of academic peer reviewers and the relative 
heteronomy of policy experts, currently their chief rivals in the struggle over 
policy relevant knowledge.
***
How does the practice of academic peer review as Lamont describes it compare 
to policy research—the term I will use to refer to the practical routines and 
repertoires that prevail in the nebulous world of think tanks? The first clear 
difference is that among think tanks, peer review itself is almost entirely absent. 
Most policy experts freely publish “policy briefs,” reports, blog postings, and 
other written products without submitting them to a peer review system. Fur-
thermore, numerous key products of policy research are not written materials 
at all, but rather speeches, briefings, panel discussions, congressional testimony, 
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and television and radio punditry. However, rather than drawing any hasty 
conclusions from this difference, let us consider the most notable similarities 
between the practical logics of peer review and policy research.
In the first place, it should come as no surprise that in neither setting can 
judgments of excellence be plausibly described as the result of a purely mental 
or cognitive process. Furthermore, both modes of judgment are inevitably 
shaped by forces external to the institutional setting itself, including conside-
rations of the most banal and prosaic sorts. Lamont cites several factors that 
fall outside of official, codified definitions of scholarly merit but condition the 
peer review process, including reviewers’ perceptions of applicants’ personal 
virtues and the time limits built into the evaluation process. Moreover, the 
same panelists sometimes make decisions in Potter Stewart-esque fashion,1 by 
using criteria that never rise to the level of consciousness. Likewise, as I will 
elaborate below, policy researchers inevitably bring factors originating outside 
of the world of think tanks to bear on the process of judging policy research. 
For the moment, however, the notable point is that in neither setting can exce-
llence be represented in terms of a pure “essence” or as a self-evident feature 
of the intellectual product.
Notwithstanding the uncertainty and fuzziness that sometimes characteri-
ze the act of judging excellence in both settings (especially where encounters 
among structurally distant actors are involved), there is a discernible social 
order to each setting. Moreover, in both cases, this order emerges largely out 
of social and interactional dynamics particular to the institutional setting in 
question.2 This is another way of saying that each domain has developed a kind 
of autonomy. Lamont, for example, describes the specific “rules” of reviewer 
deliberation, themselves based largely on shared principles of scholarly jud-
gment. Similarly, policy experts obey certain rules specific to think tanks. 
However, in the next section I will argue that this apparent similarity gives 
way to a major difference inasmuch as the form of “autonomy” found among 
think tanks is deeply fraught with paradox and better described as a kind of 
“hyper-dependence.”
Before moving on, a final point of similarity between peer review panels 
and think tanks is worth noting: the subtle layering of conflict and consensus 
within each institutional setting. As Lamont shows, peer review panels are 
pregnant with the potential for disagreement, especially those based on “epis-
1. For readers not familiar with this reference: Potter Stewart (1915-1985) was a U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice who famously acknowledged, in the context of a 1964 obscenity case, that 
the concept hard-core pornography defied easy definition, but downplayed the problem by 
writing that, “I know it when I see it.” Stewart’s quote is often held up as an exemplar of 
tautological inference.
2. I use these separate terms, social and interactional, to highlight a distinction between peer 
review panels and think tanks. In short, whereas the dynamic of peer review is anchored 
largely in direct interaction, among think tanks, more distant forms of social influence that 
cannot properly be labeled interactional (including imitation, self-differentiation, and other 
forms of mutual orientation) supply the chief relational logic.
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temic cultural” differences among disciplines. In the setting of think tanks, 
conflict and consensus also go hand in hand—political ideology being the most 
publicly salient axis of conflict, even if organizational competition, including 
between ideological allies, often eclipses ideology in its importance. Neverthe-
less, in each setting, an analytic “scale shift” underscores a layer of consensus 
rooted in the fact that the actors are engaged in a common project. On acade-
mic peer review panels, for example, disciplinary pride may induce an econo-
mist to take a dim view of a grant application endorsed by a political scientist. 
Yet if the disagreement rises to the level of open conflict, it is likely to reaffirm 
certain commonalities in the panelists’ criteria of scholarly judgment. In the 
same way, think tanks compete with one another for money, attention from 
politicians, and media coverage, even as they collaborate on projects, cultivate 
extensive network ties, and insist almost unanimously that their work is more 
“useful” and “tied to the real world” than that of their academic counterparts. 
In fact, academic scholars constitute the main reference group against which 
policy experts recognize their affinities.
This last point has major implications for the discussion. What it suggests, 
above all, is the futility of comparing peer review panelists and policy experts 
on purely analytic3 grounds, or as if the two sets of actors exist in isolation 
from each other. To adopt this approach would be to reduce the relations 
among them to relations of similarity and difference when in fact academic 
peer reviewers and policy experts inhabit the same social space and engage in 
relations of struggle, hierarchy, and mutual influence. The final section of my 
contribution will briefly consider the significance of this point and arrive at a 
general conclusion about How Professors Think.
***
Should we take the preceding discussion to mean that similarities between aca-
demic peer review and policy research outweigh differences? The question, I 
would submit, is neither trivial nor arcane, yet its answerability turns on whether 
or not it is possible to defend the utility and coherence of the concept cognitive 
autonomy. Difficult to grasp, much less to apply empirically, the “problem of 
autonomy” is one that has hampered the sociology of knowledge and intellec-
tuals since its birth. Moreover, the problem seems neither to have lessened over 
time nor in relation to the boldness of those who dismiss it. (One thinks of 
Julien Benda’s La Trahison des Clercs, Edward Said’s injunction to “Speak truth 
to power,” and Chomsky’s castigation of the “new mandarins”—all of which 
defined the intellectual’s proper mission partly in terms of cognitive autonomy 
and charged a segment of the intelligentsia with a betrayal and yet none of which 
actually resolved anything in the social scientific study of intellectuals.)
3. I use the word analytic in the sense derived from linguistics, which refers to a morphological 
category consisting of languages characterized by isolated as opposed to synthetic grammat-
ical elements.
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Faced with the absence of any pure, unvarnished, or absolute concept of 
cognitive autonomy, one confronts a seemingly stark epistemological choice. 
One path—plainly the more extreme—is to renounce the concept of auto-
nomy altogether. This is not Lamont’s position, nor is it mine, but one of 
its effects is worth noting here. Without even reverting to a philosophical 
argument against epistemological relativism, I would simply note the practi-
cal “finality” of any such stance. Just as the last move in a chess match means 
that the game is over—even for the winner—a tenable defense of epistemo-
logical relativism leaves only one non-disingenuous move for the defender: 
namely, walk away and remain silent.4 I would also note, in defending the 
need for an analytic conception of cognitive autonomy, the idea’s resonance 
in everyday speech, which is greater than commonly acknowledged. To say 
that a given statement is biased, partisan, or self-interested, for example, is 
tantamount to saying that its truth-value is wanting because the thinking 
underpinning it has met with some sort of encumbrance along the way. The 
encumbrance may be the result of direct coercion or it may be linked more 
distantly to habit, self-interest, adherence to an ideological program, loyalty 
to a national or religious culture, or some combination of these. It does not 
matter: the point is that the everyday coherence and self-resonance of truth-
claims generally rest on an implied background notion akin to cognitive 
autonomy.
What this discussion suggests to me is the need to fortify a conception 
of cognitive autonomy rooted in intellectual practices and relations. Among 
sociologists, the best approach has been offered by sociologists who insist on 
rescuing the idea of cognitive autonomy from its “theoreticist” confinement 
by assigning it these features:
(i) Social. On this view, cognitive autonomy is a property that obtains at the 
level of the group and depends on a notion akin to epistemic culture. Just as 
it is nonsensical to speak of a private language or culture, in other words, 
we can posit the impossibility of a private or individual autonomy;
(ii) Generative. As opposed to mere freedom from constraint, cognitive auto-
nomy must be understood in terms of positive commitment or duty with 
respect to an epistemic culture. In this sense, the Kantian notion of free-
dom as obedience to a self-imposed rule supplies a useful analogy;
(iii) Conditional. To reiterate a point made earlier, there is no such thing 
as cognitive autonomy in any pure or absolute sense; any claim about a 
group’s autonomy therefore implies some kind of comparison or contextual 
description. 
4. It is difficult to raise this point without also mentioning Lamont’s (1987) classic piece about 
Jacques Derrida’s intellectual career. He did not walk away or remain silent, but the latter 
stage of his career seems to reaffirm my central point, albeit in a different sense. As many 
scholars have argued, Derrida was compelled to invent ever more elaborate ways of saying, 
in effect, that there was no stable truth to express.
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Among social theorists who might be identified with the view of cogni-
tive autonomy I am suggesting here, Bourdieu is likely the most prominent 
contemporary thinker; however, the idea’s long pedigree extends at least to 
Weber’s claims about the disaggregation of modern societies into autonomous 
and incompatible value spheres.
Drawing on a notion of cognitive autonomy as a social, generative, and 
conditional property, I would argue that the differences between think tanks 
and academic peer review panels vastly outweigh the similarities. As noted 
above, few think tank-affiliated policy experts must subject themselves to the 
judgments of peers who enforce positive standards of intellectual rigor. Fur-
thermore, insofar as think tanks collectively acquire a form of autonomy, it 
is a peculiar one built on an elaborate balancing act or game of separation 
and attachment vis-à-vis other, more established fields—especially those of 
academic, political, economic, and media production. Insofar as think tanks 
align themselves with the world of scholarly production, they tend to do so 
in a temporary and superficial manner, in order to capture a dose of academic 
authority without accruing any of the dishonors associated with the image of 
the “ivory tower.” Too much scholasticism impedes their pursuit of political 
relevance, funding, and publicity. Although in their public self-descriptions 
policy experts often emphasize the idea of scholarly rigor (or, in the words of 
one think tank, a single-minded “commitment to…reason and facts”), the 
most significant rewards generally flow to those who can skillfully balance the 
contradictory styles of the policy aide, the lobbyist, the public relations guru, 
the political consultant, the entrepreneur, and, to some degree, the academic 
scholar (Medvetz 2010). This means that the following qualities can all signi-
ficantly enhance a policy expert’s reputation: a knack for making memorable 
quips, sound bites, and slogans; willingness to engage in the rapid-fire pro-
duction of policy briefs and memos (often in reaction to still-developing news 
stories); the ability to predict which policy issues will become “hot” in the near 
future; being “good on television”; and, perhaps most important, establishing 
rapport with donors.5
Elsewhere I have argued that “the search for the totally unencumbered 
intellectual is a futile one, since all intellectuals—from the college professor 
who must ‘publish or perish’ to the technocrat who cannot challenge the basic 
premises of her research assignment—face certain necessities and constraints 
in their work” (Medvetz 2012: 153). The inverse point is equally significant: 
“the language of pure determination is troublesome as well, since even if inte-
5. In an interview, Norm Ornstein, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute whom The 
Washington Monthly once dubbed the “king of quotes” for his prodigiousness in supplying 
sound bites to American journalists, told me with notable pride that editors at the Los Ange-
les Times—having reached the conclusion that their newspaper had grown too dependent 
on Ornstein quotes—issued an explicit moratorium on statements from the policy expert. 
It seems likely that Ornstein could experience this episode as a “victory,” even though its 
result was an enforced (albeit circumscribed) form of invisibility, precisely because it exposed 
a weakness in the journalistic field itself.
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llectuals are always constrained in some way, they are inevitably motivated 
by certain positive ambitions, drives, and desires.” (Ibid.). Put differently, 
opening the black box of cognitive autonomy requires describing these posi-
tive ambitions, drives, and desires in practical and social terms, which rest on 
the presence of communities of relatively like-minded thinkers who tacitly or 
explicitly possess what Lamont calls “shared definitions of quality”. This is 
precisely what I believe How Professors Think does so well.
My only quarrel with the book lies in its occasional tendency to revert to 
a purely philosophical notion of cognitive autonomy through the reflex of 
giving equal weight to autonomy’s limits and reach. Widening the analytic lens 
slightly beyond the world of academic peer review leads to a different empha-
sis. After all, when situated in the broader intellectual field, the peer review 
panels Lamont studies become notable for their relatively high self-governing 
capacities and their stable ties to disciplinary and professional organizations, 
departmental units, and academic journals. To be sure, How Professors Think 
also considers the threats to autonomy experienced by two academic disciplines 
in which the “problem of the boundary” is posed somewhat acutely: namely, 
anthropology and English literary studies. However, I would submit that such 
threats are the norm rather than the exception—and that a proper sociology of 
knowledge and intellectuals must proceed from the Nietzschean maxim that 
those “who leave every glass standing only half-emptied refuse to admit that 
everything in the world has its sediments and dregs.” Put differently, opening 
the black box of autonomy inevitably reveals “sediments and dregs.” Thus, to 
emphasize the absence of pure cognitive freedom in the name of “moderation” 
is to risk honoring the sort of mediocrity to which the same writer referred 
in the following terms: “Virtue for them is what maketh modest and tame… 
That, however—is mediocrity though it be called moderation.”
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